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A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF ADEA AND ITS IMPACT ON OLDER WORKERS, EMPLOYER
EFFICIENCY AND HUMAN RESOURCE PRACTICES

M. ELIZABETH STACHURA, Esq.
University of Rhode Island

The question that this paper addresses is
whether age discrimination laws are justified for
the protection of older workers from a societal and
economic point of view. An analysis of the
congressional intent in enacting the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and a
brief review of significant court interpretations of
the ADEA provides initial insight into the
legislative objectives and the unique problems that
older persons face in the workforce. Both the
positive and negative impacts of the ADEA on
older workers and cost efficiency objectives of
employers are evaluated. Despite certain of its
limitations in protecting older workers and
increase in costs to employers, the enactment of
the ADEA has been instrumental in initiating
policies that address the changing demographic of
an aging workforce and prompting a
transformation in human resource practices
towards older workers.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
The ADEA states as its objective in broad
terms: to promote the employment of older
persons based on their ability rather than age; to
prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in
employment; to help employers and workers find
ways of meeting problems arising from the impact
of age on employment.1 Whether the ADEA is
effective in meeting its objectives is unsettled.
The longstanding problem with anti-age
discrimination legislation, including the ADEA, is
that the enforcement mechanisms typically bear
little consequence to the violator. While preADEA laws lacked any administrative procedures
to uphold policies, the ADEA is enforced through
the
Equal
Opportunities
Employment
Commission, as are Title VII violations.
However, the damages to an employer for
violating the ADEA are slight compared to other
discrimination violations. Furthermore, injunctive
1
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relief in which the older worker is rehired is not a
desirable remedy for the typical worker who has
resorted to filing a claim against their employer.
Legislative History
Age discrimination legislation at the federal
level has a history that precedes the enactment of
the 1967 Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA)2. In 1956, the United States Civil Service
Commission “abolished maximum ages of entry
into employment…eliminating age discrimination
in hiring in federal employment” (Neumark,
March 2001:2).
Executive Order No. 11141
issued in 1964 established a policy that prohibited
age discrimination in the employment of federal
contractors. (Neumark, March 2001:2). Congress
enacted the Older Americans Act in 1965 which
“was designed to encourage research and
programs to aid the aged, but also stated among its
general
objectives
‘the
opportunity
for
employment with no discriminatory personnel
practices because of age’” (Neumark, March
2001:2). The problem with these executive and
congressional initiatives is that they failed to
establish administrative procedures for upholding
their polices, rendering them ineffective.
(Neumark, March 2001).
At the state level, legislative prohibitions
against age discrimination were enacted as early as
1903 (Neumark & Stock, July 1997), and began to
parallel the later federal legislation beginning in
the 1930’s (Neumark, March 2001). State laws
that included anti-age discrimination provisions
were commonly part of the fair employment
practices legislation, with a civil rights
commission or labor department that had powers
of conciliation and enforcement (Neumark et al.,
July 1997).
Those state laws without any
enforcement provisions had little or no impact.
The ADEA was enacted by Congress in 1967
in the wake of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
2
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1964 (Title VII)3, which prohibits employment
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin. The ADEA has many parallels
with Title VII: it defines as illegal many of the
same activities (Neumark, March 2001); and, it is
enforced by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission.
However, as highlighted by
Neumark (2001, pp. 5-6), there are differences
regarding the treatment of age in the labor market:
“[T]he ADEA recognizes the role of seniority
systems, and as such protects the use of a bona
fide seniority system, as long as it is not used to
evade the purposes of the Act. It also recognizes
that some work limitations may arise with age, and
hence permits the use of age as a bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ) that is
‘reasonably necessary to the normal operation of a
business’. Finally, it recognizes that cost related
to benefits may be higher for older workers, and
makes some allowances for this; in particular, an
employer can offer younger and older workers
benefits that cost the same, even if the actual
benefit to the older worker is less.”
Differential treatment based on age, as
compared with race and sex, is typically derived
from negative stereotypes of older workers
(Crawshaw-Lewis, 1996); whereas the basis for
Title VII protections is largely to combat hostile
intentional discrimination based on prejudice or
bias. The record of the debate over the ADEA
from the Congressional Record, as cited by
Crawshaw-Lewis (1996, p. 770), underscores the
point: “The bill recognizes two distinct types of
unfair discrimination based on age: First, the
discrimination which is the result of
misunderstanding of the relationship of age to
usefulness; and second, the discrimination which
is a result of a deliberate disregard of a worker’s
value solely because of age.”
In addition,
“Congress found that setting arbitrary age limits
without regard to potential for job performance
was common and that unemployment with
attendant deterioration in skills and moral was
higher for older workers as compared to those who
are younger” (Donald J. Spero, 2004).
The ADEA has undergone significant
amendments since its original enactment. In 1978,
the ADEA was amended to raise the age

protection limit from ages forty (40) through sixtyfive (65), to age seventy (70). This amendment
also resulted in raising the mandatory retirement
age to seventy (70), with certain exceptions
(Neumark, March 2001). The ADEA was later
amended in 1986 to eliminate the age cap, which
resulted in the prohibition of mandatory
retirement.
Once mandatory retirement was disallowed by
the 1986 amendment, employers turned to
financial inducements for workers to retire, which
led to the enactment of the 1990 Older Workers
Protection Act (OWBPS)4 (Neumark, March
2001). The OWBPS
prohibits discrimination
with respect to employee benefits on the basis of
age and regulates early retirement incentive
programs. Under the OWBPA, employees eligible
for early retirement incentive plans must be
provided with complete and accurate information
concerning what benefits are available under the
plan. The OWBPS also insures that workers are
not compelled or pressured to waive their rights
under the ADEA. If certain conditions of the
OWBPA are met, employees may legally sign
waivers of their ADEA rights to sue for age
discrimination (Alexander Hamilton Institute,
2005) The federal courts have found releases
invalid which have not provided the ages of both
those who have been terminated and those who
have been retained, so that workers can determine
whether they would have an age discrimination
claim (McMorris, 1998).
Judicial Interpretation of the ADEA
Under the ADEA, an employee can establish a
claim for protection against discrimination on the
basis of age by proving: first, that the employee is
a member of the protected class (i.e. over forty
[40] years of age); second, that the employee is
qualified to do the job; third, that the employee
was subject to adverse employment action; and
fourth, that the employee was replaced by a person
outside the age group.
In order to meet their burden of proof, an
employee must present evidence that the employer
intentionally treated the employee less favorable
because of age. This theory of recovery under the
4
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ADEA is known as “disparate treatment.” 5 Age
discrimination may be proven through direct
evidence, for example, a disparaging remark from
an employer that an employee is “too old.” It
may also be proven through circumstantial
evidence by which indirect evidence of
discrimination is established by inference of
certain fact from another, without direct proof.
Assuming an employee meets their burden of
proof, the burden shifts to the employer to
articulate a non-discriminatory reason for the
adverse action. The employer is not obligated to
prove the non-discriminatory intent, but merely to
state it. The reason may be based on mistaken
belief, a poor reason, or no reason at all. If the
employer articulates a non-discriminatory reason
in good faith, it is sufficient to rebut the
employee’s principle case.
In the event of a rebuttal, the burden switches
back to the employee to demonstrate that the
reason articulated for the employer’s adverse
action is merely a pretext for discrimination. The
employee may meet their proof by showing that
the employer’s reason is not believable, or that
people outside the protected age group (less than
forty [40] years of age), were treated more
favorably under like circumstances.
In Title VII actions alleging employment
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin, the United States Supreme
Court, in the case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
(1971)6, established a theory of recovery known as
“disparate impact.” In order to prove “disparate
impact”, it is not necessary for the employee to
prove that its employer intentionally discriminated
based on age. Rather discrimination under this
theory of recover requires:
“first, that an
employer’s policy that may appear neutral in fact
impacts older individuals more adversely; and
second, that the practice cannot be justified by
‘business
necessity’”
(Starkman,
1992).
“Disparate impact” is most commonly established
through statistical evidence that demonstrates a
pattern of discrimination on the basis of age.

The recent United States Supreme Court
case of Smith, et al. v. City of Jackson (2005)7
addressed an issue on which the federal courts had
been divided, namely, whether the “disparate
impact” theory of recovery announced in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co. (1971), for cases brought under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, is
cognizable under the ADEA.8 The Smith Court
held as follows: “The ADEA authorizes recovery
in disparate-impact cases comparable to Griggs…
Except for the substitution of ‘age’” for ‘race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin,’ the
language of ADEA §4(a)(2) and Title VII
§703(a)(2) is identical. Unlike Title VII, however,
ADEA §4(f)(1) significantly narrows its coverage
by permitting any ‘otherwise prohibited’ action
‘where the differentiation is based on reasonable
factors other than age’ (hereinafter RFOA
provision).”9
Justice Stevens who wrote the Smith decision
disputed the suggestion of Justice O’Connor that
the RFOA provision is a “safe harbor from
liability.”10 Citing the case of Teamsters v. United
States (1977)11, Justice Stevens emphasized that
“claims that stress ‘disparate impact’ involve
employment practices that are facially neutral in
their treatment of difference groups but that in fact
fall more harshly on one group than another….”
Justice Stevens concluded accordingly that it is “in
cases involving disparate-impact claims that the
RFOA provision plays its principal role by
precluding liability if the adverse impact was
attributable to a nonage factor that was
‘reasonable.’”12
Stevens further notes that “if
Congress intended to prohibit all disparate-impact
claims, it certainly would have do so….The fact
that Congress provided that employees could use
only reasonable factors in defending a suit under
the ADEA is therefore instructive.”13
In an earlier decision, Hazen Paper Co. v.
Biggins (1993),14 the United States Supreme Court
“on the one hand noted that the ADEA was
7

544 U. S.____ (2005)
Smith, No. 03—1160, p. 1
9
Ibid. at p. 2-4
10
Ibid. at p. 10
11
431 U. S. 324, 335-336, n.15 (1977)
12
Smith at p. 10
13
Ibid. at p. 10, n.11
14
507 U. S. 604 (1993)
8
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431 U.S. 324 (1977)
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401 U. S. 424 (1971)
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concerned with employment decisions based on
age stereotyping, but on the other hand allowed
decisions to be based on factors like seniority that
may be strongly correlated with (but analytically
distinct from) age, instructing lower courts to look
for evidence of whether age actually motivated the
decision ” (Neumark, March 2001:11) (CrawshawLewis, 1996). According to Crawshaw-Lewis
(1996, p. 781), “since Hazen, the courts have been
much less favorable to age discrimination
disparate impact claims based on the argument
that an employer’s decision was motivated by the
higher salary of an older worker, with some courts
ruling that firing employees based on high
compensation stemming from seniority does not
violate the ADEA” (Neumark, March 2001:1112).
IMPACT OF ADEA ON OLDER WORKERS
The ADEA has improved the relevant
employment opportunities for older workers and
reduced their retirement. However, aggrieved
older employees face a difficult burden in proving
age discrimination because of the “reasonable
factor other than age” defense available to
employers under the ADEA, which does not exist
as a defense under Title VII actions. Even if an
employee is successful in proving age
discrimination, the damages are generally small,
providing limited disincentives for employers to
address human resource policies that negatively
impact older workers.
Pre-ADEA
Prior to the enactment of the ADEA, “general
unemployment rates were highest for the youngest
part of the population;” however, “there were also
some indications that older workers who lost their
jobs had a more difficult time finding new jobs
than did ‘prime age’ workers” (Neumark, March
2001:13) Researchers have also determined that
the durations of unemployment were also longer
for older workers (Neumark, March 2001).
Moreover, the figures used to establish such
theories have been noted to be understated because
older workers who were unable to find
employment were more likely to leave the
workforce altogether, and thus avoid being
counted as “unemployed.” (Neumark, March
2001).

4

In addition, restrictions in hiring significantly
deterred the employment of older workers.
According to surveys conducted in New York
between the years 1957 and 1958, forty-two (42%)
percent of firms had maximum age restrictions of
fifty (50) years of age for new hires (Neumark,
March 2001:16).
Similarly, a United States
Department of Labor study conducted in 1965
determined that among the states that did not have
discrimination statutes, nearly sixty (60) percent
imposed upper age limits within the range of fortyfive and fifty (45-50) year of age (Neumark,
March 2001:16). These figures dispute claims that
both higher and longer unemployment rates among
older workers did not solely result from worker
choice (Neumark, March 2001:14).
Enactment of the ADEA
Although the ADEA was enacted only a few
years after the anti-discrimination laws of Title
VII, and was similar in its objectives and
enforcement provisions, age discrimination was
perceived differently.
As Neumark (March
2001:18) notes, “animus towards older workers
was not the view of the original Department of
Labor report (U.S. Department of Labor, 1965)
arguing for passage of the ADEA, and it seems
difficult to view age discrimination in the same
light as race discrimination, for which we have a
well-document history of animus.” It was further
observed that “the kind of ‘we-they’ thinking that
foster racial, ethnic, and sexual discrimination is
unlikely to play a role in the treatment of older
workers” (Posner, 1995), “because the people who
make the firing and hiring decisions are often
older workers” (Neumark, March 2001:18).
Researchers have frequently observed that age
discrimination is rooted more in stereotype than it
is in animus. Those who have conducted studies
in the field of industrial gerontology have explored
“the effects of aging on productivity and
supervisor appraisals (which could reflect
stereotypes), and found evidence of productivity
either holding steady or declining slightly”
(Neumark, March 2001:19). Neumark (March
2001:19) further states that other evidence points
to vision, hearing, ease of memorization, and
computational speed, for example, but that there is
an offset: “aging is associated with declines in
creativity but increases in leadership and abilities.”
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Neumark (March 2001:19) surmises that “with
the evidence suggesting that many differences
between older and younger workers are largely
non-existent or small, negative stereotypes about
older workers and classifications based on them
seem likely to act-at least sometimes-in an
arbitrary fashion, harming many productive
workers.”
In addition to improving the overall
employment opportunities for older workers and
reducing their retirement, the ADEA has had the
predominant effect of reducing the likelihood that
firms renege on long-term relationships between
workers and firms” (Neumark, March, 2001:35).
By comparison, consider that in the United
Kingdom where there are no laws prohibiting
discrimination on basis of age there is “evidence
of persistent and widespread discrimination
against older workers in both the private and
public sectors” (Chiu, Chan, Snape, & Redman,
2001)
The federal courts have upheld the objectives
of the ADEA in matters concerning pensions and
hiring practices. The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals decided that an employer sponsored
health plans that provided different benefits for
Medicare-eligible retirees younger than age 65
violated ADEA 15 (Employee Benefit Plan
Review, 2000). Moreover, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals in the seminal case of Taggart v.
Time Incorporated16 determined that “declining to
hire an older person for being ‘overqualified’ can
be grounds for an age discrimination suit.”
According to Target court, “such a reason may
often be simply a code word for too old”
(Lambert & Hayes, 1991)
Lambert & Hayes
(1992:2) include the quotation of a lawyer who
defends against age discrimination who sneered
that “over-qualification” is simply a “buzzword for
‘we’ll have to pay him too much’”. Even the
Target court made the common sense query:
“How can a person overqualified by experience
and training be turned down for a position given to
a younger person deemed better qualified?”
Despite the court ruling in Target, it is important
to note that “the ADEA does not prohibit
employers from using ‘overqualified’ as a negative
15

See Lavia v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et.
(No. 99-3863), Third Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals
16
924 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1991)
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criterion in personnel actions-as long as it has a
performance related basis” (Kandel, 1991).
Barriers to ADEA Protections
Citing the work of Posner (1995, Ch. 13),
Neumark (March, 2001:30) sets forth the
argument that the ADEA acts to reduce hiring of
older workers for two reasons: “first …the costs of
hiring these workers are increased as a result of
their new legal rights under the ADEA;” and,
“second, because damages in hiring discrimination
cases are likely to be small, while injunctive reliefhiring the older worker who has filed a claim- is
unlikely to be attractive the plaintiff, legal action
is unlikely to be effective in increasing hiring of
older workers.”
In addition, ADEA cases are difficult to prove
for older workers. The “reasonable factor other
than age” defense available to employers makes
any discriminatory treatment of older workers
difficult to prove, short of an overt disparaging
remark. Most employers are educated enough not
to make that obvious mistake.
Recent studies and reports on the status of age
discrimination
in
employment
are
not
encouraging. The executives of ExecuNet, a
career networking job search engine found that
“eighty-two (82%) percent of those surveyed
consider age bias a ‘serious problem’ in today’s
workplace, up from seventy-eight (78%) percent
in 2001” (Fischer, 2004:1) A report on NASA
noted similarly discouraging outcomes: “age
discrimination…seems to be endemic to the entire
aerospace industry (Khol, 2003:2). NASA has
informed unsuccessful older candidates that
NASA is trying to fill its positions with people
who are ‘fresh out,’ meaning fresh out of college”
(Khol, 2003:2). Khol (2003:3) comments that
aside from being illegal, these actions shed light
on why “NASA is losing technological
competency.”
IMPACT ON COST EFFICIENCY
OBJECTIVES OF EMPLOYERS
The research conclusions about the impact of
the ADEA on cost efficiency objectives of
employers are varied. Neumark & Stock (1997:1),
in their analysis of the work of Lazear (1979,
1981), dispute his conclusion that age
discrimination laws limit the use of long-term
incentive contracts (“Lazear contracts”) and
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reduce efficiency. Other researchers conclude that
the ADEA was never intended to negatively
impact cost efficiency and that the courts have
upheld the determination. Still others claim that
the ADEA is tantamount to “rent-seeking”,
meaning that it provides and unjustifiable
“windfall” to older workers.
Lazear Contracts
The term “Lazear Contracts,” which are long
term incentive contracts, are derived from the
influential research of Lazear (1979, 1981)
(Neumark & Stock, 1997:1). In 1979, Lazear
created a model of efficient long-term incentive
contracts in which employers impose involuntary
retirement based on age. Age discrimination laws,
which bar involuntary terminations based on age,
discourage the use of such contracts and reduce
efficiency.
Citing the work of Lazear
(1979:1283-84), Neumark & Stock, 1997:1) note
his argument that “…because the wage of older
workers exceeds their reservation wage, an
implication of eliminating the ability of firms to
use involuntary retirement based on age is that
‘current older workers will enjoy a small one-andfor-all gain at the expense of a much larger and
continuing efficiency loss that affects all workers
and firms adversely.’”
The analysis of Neumark & Stock (1997:1)
resulted in their reaching the conclusion that the
implications of age discrimination laws in
Lazear’s model have little impact. First, “not all
pension plans encourage early retirement, firms
have remained able to offer financial incentives
that induce retirement at specific ages;” and
second, “mandatory retirement per se was
generally unimportant in inducing retirement for
all but a small percentage of workers” (Neumark
& Stock, 1997:5-6).
Moreover, the “laws…serve as a precommitment device that makes credible the longterm commitment to workers that firms must make
under long-term incentive contracts, by making it
costly for firms to dismiss older workers to whom
payments in excess of current marginal product
are owed (Neumark & Stock, 1997: 43).
Neumark & Stock (1997:43-44) explain that
“forcing workers to retire at some point (in
Lazear’s model, when the present values of the
streams of wages and marginal products are equal)

6

may appear to be made more difficult if mandatory
retirement is prohibited, but under the ADEA
firms retain the ability to offer strong financial
incentives to encourage retirement at any age they
choose.”
Consequently, Neumark & Stock
(1997:44) explain that “this alternative perspective
suggests that the predominant effect of the ADEA
and other age discrimination laws may have been
to strengthen the bonds between workers and
firms, thus enabling greater use of Lazear
contracts.”
The result is to “…boost the
employment of order workers, while having
essentially no effect on employment of younger,
unprotected workers” (Neumark & Stock, 1997:
44).
Accordingly, “…age discrimination laws
lead to steeper age-earnings profiles in the labor
market….increasing rather than decreasing labor
market efficiency” (Neumark & Stock, 1997:44).
Cost Efficiency Not in Jeopardy
The federal courts have held that replacing
older workers for economic reasons does not
violate the ADEA.
Some argue that such
consistent court rulings in favor of economic
incentives indicate that the ADEA was never
intended to jeopardize the cost-efficiency of
business. (HR Focus, 1997).
Others have
emphasized the corporate rationale for keeping
older workers on the payroll, which is pure
economics: “…keeping an employee on payroll
saves companies money because they don’t have
to pay out pensions later” (Capowski, 1994).
Additionally, the most effective way to avoid costs
related to the ADEA violations is for employer to
be “cautious and ensure that legitimate workrelated reasons exist for ending and employee’s
employment” (Zall, 2000:40).
High Costs to Employers
The most commonly cited arguments against
age discrimination laws are that they increase
employer costs because of the higher likelihood of
illness and death among older workers, and the
higher costs of health insurance and life insurance.
In addition, employers argue that when older
workers are trained, there is less time to recoup
from that investment in human capital. (Neumark,
March 2001).
The more controversial argument against age
discrimination laws is that they provide essentially
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a “windfall” to older workers. Among the theories
of Lazear (1979: 1283-4) is the premise that
“…current older workers will enjoy a small onceand-for-all gain at the expense of a much larger
and continuing efficiency loss that affects all
workers and firms adversely. (Neumark, March
2001)
Similarly, some are critical that the “entire
structure of anti-age discrimination legislation
reflects “rent-seeking” behavior on the part of
older workers” (Issacharoff and Worth Harris,
1997:796). According to this theory, it is argued
that Congress, in passing the ADEA, intended to
protect older workers from maximum age limits
for new hires, but the typical plaintiff is seeking
redress over dismissal. (Neumark, March 2001:
32). As a result, the “ADEA is form of protection
against wrongful discharge of older white males”
(Neumark, March 2001).
THE ADEA AND HUMAN RESOURCE
PRACTICES
Capowski (1994:1) cautioned ten years ago
that “workers 55 and older are the fastest growing
segment of the workforce, with the median age of
the workforce projected to reach 40 by 2010.”
How to deal with this phenomenon is the
fundamental question that employers need to
address. (Capowski, 1994:1). First and foremost,
it is imperative that employers have a grasp on
how their ingrained personnel policies, as well as
their personal stereotypes, may ultimately
sabotage human resource objectives.
In the
absence of change, it may be difficult for
employers to meet their objective of gathering and
sustaining a competent, productive and committed
workforce. Similarly, older workers attempting to
remain in the workforce or reenter to need to have
a clear appreciation of what makes a candidate
competitive in today’s changing workforce.
Overcome Stereotypes
In 1997, a study was conducted by Rosen and
Jerdee in which they used various hypothetical
scenarios to evaluate the personnel decisions of
managers. As a result of this study Rosen and
Jerdee (1997) concluded that: “first, managers
perceive older workers as less flexible and more
resistant to change; second, managers are less
inclined to provide support for career development
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and training of older workers; and, third,
promotion opportunities for older workers are
more likely to be restricted in jobs requiring
flexibility, creativity, and high motivation”
(Neumark, March 2001).
Certain researches found a “negative
relationship between employee age and the
performance ratings they received from their
supervisors…despite the fact that systematic
difference in performance between workers
involved in the study did not seem to exist” (Ferris
& King, 1992). Ferris and King (1992:7) found
that the potential explanation for what may appear
to be intentional age discrimination in evaluation
is that “older people behave less politically and
thus receive lower performance ratings than
younger people in the same job.” The real issue is
not one of competence or ability, but rather the
reality that “older employees receive lower
performance ratings because they are less effective
(or willing to try) at manipulating how the
supervisor likes them” (Ferris & King, 1992:7).
Consider Alternative Employment
Arrangements
Capwoski
(1994:2-3)
emphasizes
the
importance of establishing policies that are
flexible and accommodate a changing diverse
work force, especially with older workers. In
support of employing older workers, studies have
shown that the capacity to learn continues into 70s
and beyond for most people. (Capwoski, 1994:3).
Capwoski (1994:3) cites the employment policies
of McDonalds which have encouraged older
workers, recognizing that the shortage of younger
workers was a bad demographic trend.
McDonald’s took a “proactive approach and
instituted McMaster’s program, a formal
recruitment and training program” (Capwoski,
1994:3). While the McMaster’s program is no
longer officially in place, “more than 40,000
seniors work in McDonald’s around world”
(Capwoski, 1994:3). McDonald’s has found that
its older workers are very dependable and
committed; seniors and young employees work
well together; and, seniors act as mentors.
(Capwoski, 1994).
According
to
certain
theorists,
age
discrimination is the direct neglect by employers
to maintain and support workers who are [over
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forty (40)]. (Martinez & Kleiner, 1993).
Employers are encouraged to develop objective
standards of employment for all workers, and
break the mindset that retirees can only help fill
unskilled positions. (Martinez & Kleiner, 1993:5).
Moreover, it is economically beneficial for
employers to consider alternative work options
such as, “part-time, consulting, reduced pay, job
sharing, compressed work week, and job rotation.”
(Martinez & Kleiner, 1993:5). Losing an older
experienced workforce often ends up being
expensive. The costs include “replacement costs,
retraining costs and downtime following layoffs;”
and, in addition, “companies forfeit experience,
expertise, commitment, loyalty, maturity and
productivity of a growing group of workers”
(Martinez & Kleiner, 1993:4). Employers need to
adopt polices that encourage flexibility, include
tapering off programs and a reduction of hours that
eases older workers into the retirement process.
(Martinez & Kleiner, 1993:5). The key is for
employers to adapt to “look at workers as
individuals, not older” and “manage based on
capabilities and performance” (Martinez &
Kleiner, 1993:4).
Recognize the Changing Workplace
Older workers have at their disposal certain
strategies to held overcome age discrimination. In
order to combat age bias, it is recommended that
older workers “go into an interview with detailed
research showing that you understand the
business, the challenges it faces, and what
problems need solving; interviewers will tend to
look past your age and focus on your ideas”
(Fischer, 2004:2). Other recommendations are
that older workers stay current with industry
developments, keep skills sharp and stay in touch
with professional contacts. (Fischer, 2004).
Garner your Strengths
Researchers have found evidence to support
that older workers have a stronger work ethic and
are more willing to do thought in-depth research.
(Fischer, 2004:2). Likewise, “older workers tend
to ‘be less self-absorbed and more selfaware’…they usually have a better understanding
of their skills and limitations, and of what’s
important in life” (Fischer, 2004:2).
Older
workers are often “at a point in their lives at which
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they’re not interested in being a CEO or in trying
to cross another bridge too far. They know what
they do best” (Bonney, Mar 22, 2004).
A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
In an article published by the United Nations
Department of Public Information in response the
2002 World Assembly on Aging II, the policy
response was: “The vitality of our societies will
increasingly depend on active participation by
older persons. It is therefore imperative that we
foster economic and social conditions that will
allow people of all ages to remain integrated into
society. An essential challenge is to promote a
culture that values the experience and knowledge
that come with age” (Annan, March, 2002:5) he
International Labour Organization (ILO) is also
dedicated to ensuring decent work or retirement
for older people. (Annan, March, 2002:6). The
ILO calls upon states: “…to adopt national
policies to promote equality of opportunity and
treatment for workers, whatever their age; and to
take measures to prevent discrimination against
older workers, particularly with regard to: access
to vocational guidance and placement services;
access to employment of their choice that takes
into account their personal skills, experience and
qualifications; access to vocational training, in
particular; further training and retraining; and
employment security” (Annan, March, 2002:6).
On the issue of retirement, the ILO further
recommends “that measure be taken to ensure that
the transition from work to retirement is gradual,
that retirement is voluntary, and that the age
qualifying a person for a pension is flexible”
(Annan, March, 2002:7).
The issue is
fundamental, especially as rapidly aging
workforces in the United States and other
industrialized countries threaten to vastly increase
the social costs of any barriers to older workers’
employment. (Johnson & Neumark, 1997;
Neumark, March 2001).
CONCLUSION
The enactment of the ADEA has been
critically important for the elimination of age
restrictions in the hiring of older workers and
mandatory retirement. The ADEA has not been as
powerful a deterrent against employment policies
that, in fact, impact older workers negatively.
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Such policies are not illegal under the ADEA as
long as their basis is a “reasonable factor other
than age.” Moreover, the replacement of older
workers for economic reasons has been upheld by
the courts as “reasonable.”
The societal gains in integrating an aging
population into the workforce in meaningful ways
far outweigh the costs to employers. Alternative
work arrangements that fairly compensate older
workers for their contributions to the workforce
serve not only to benefit individual employers, but
also society in general as the public dole is not left
to fill the economic void. Researchers who study
older populations have concluded that the limited
diminishment in older persons is generally offset
by gains in the areas of life experience, priority
setting and leadership abilities. Consequently, the
vitality of the workforce depends on progressive
human resource practices that promote equality
and opportunity for workers regardless of age.
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